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In the run-up to the Russian presidential elections on 18 March 2018, the 
Kremlin further tightened the federal “vertical of power” that Vladimir Putin 
has developed since 2000. In the North Caucasus, this above all concerns the 
republic of Dagestan. Moscow intervened with a powerful purge, replacing 
the entire political leadership. The situation in Chechnya, which has been 
ruled by Ramzan Kadyrov since 2007, is conspicuously different. From the 
early 2000s onwards, President Putin conducted a policy of “Chechenisation” 
there, delegating the fight against the armed revolt to local security forces. 
Under Putin’s protection, the republic gained a leadership which is now 
publicly referred to by Russians as the “Chechen Khanate”, among other 
similar expressions. Kadyrov’s breadth of power encompasses an independ-
ent foreign policy, which is primarily orientated towards the Middle East. 
Kadyrov emphatically professes that his republic is part of Russia and 
presents himself as “Putin’s foot soldier”. Yet he has also transformed the 
federal subject of Chechnya into a private state. The ambiguous relationship 
between this republic and the central power fundamentally rests on the 
loyalty pact between Putin and Kadyrov. However, criticism of this arrange-
ment can now occasionally be heard even in the Russian president’s inner 
circles. With regard to Putin’s fourth term, the question arises just how long 
the pact will last. The price that Moscow was willing to accept for Chech-
nya’s “pacification” by Kadyrov and his supporters include serious human-
rights violations. Since 2017 these have increasingly moved back into the 
focus of international politics and reporting. 
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Issues and Conclusions 
Chechnya’s Status within the 
Russian Federation. 
Ramzan Kadyrov’s Private State and 
Vladimir Putin’s Federal “Power Vertical” 
The current head of the Chechen republic, Ramzan 
Kadyrov, has ruled for over a decade, during which 
period Chechnya’s relationship with the Russian 
Federation has become ambiguous. Kadyrov makes 
strenuous efforts to proclaim that the republic is part 
of Russia, to link Chechen nationalism with Russian 
patriotism, to portray Russia’s president in the 
Chechen capital Grozny as a state icon, and to present 
himself as “Putin’s foot soldier”. Yet he has turned 
the federal subject of Chechnya into a private state to 
such an extent that the Russian President’s entourage 
is asking itself to what degree the federal “vertical 
of power” developed by Vladimir Putin extends to 
Chechnya. Among Russians, expressions such as the 
“Chechen Khanate” or “Kadyrov’s caliphate” have 
gained currency. From a historical perspective, Chech-
nya’s position within the Russian Federation has been 
compared to the Central-Asian Emirate of Bukhara, 
which enjoyed a maximum of autonomy within the 
power structure of the Tsarist Empire in the late 19th 
and early 20th century. 
Kadyrov’s self-arrogated powers also encompass 
a foreign policy that is primarily orientated towards 
the Middle East and the Islamic world as a whole. No 
other regional leader has claimed a comparable role 
for himself, extending beyond his own administrative 
area and beyond Russia’s borders. Here too the above-
mentioned ambiguity is in evidence. On the one 
hand, the Kremlin welcomes the division of diplo-
matic labour vis-à-vis the Islamic world between Mos-
cow and Grozny. On the other hand, this situation 
creates contradictions, as was shown for instance 
in Moscow’s and Grozny’s divergent statements 
regarding the persecution of the Rohingya ethnic 
group in Myanmar. 
In the 1990s, Chechnya became the epitome of 
separatism in post-Soviet Russia. Within the renegade 
republic, a national movement invoked a historical 
continuity of anti-colonial resistance to Russian do-
minion. In 1991 Dzhokhar Dudayev, the then-leader 
of the Chechen secessionist movement, demanded 
a peace treaty to put an end to “the 300-year war 
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between the Russian Empire and the Chechen people”. 
Moscow’s response to these efforts consisted of 
massive military operations. According to the official 
interpretation, in the first war (1994–1996) Russian 
forces in Chechnya combated ethno-territorial sepa-
ratism; in the second war, which began in 1999 and 
officially ended in 2009, they fought international 
Islamist terrorism. The two wars are the most violent 
events in the post-Soviet space. In terms of casualties 
and the extent of town and settlement destruction, 
their consequences easily eclipse the secession wars 
in the Southern Caucasus (1991–1994), the civil 
war in Central-Asian Tajikistan (1992–1997) and 
the battles in East Ukraine from 2014 onwards. Nowa-
days, the Kadyrov republic portrays itself as an ad-
vocate for Russian multiethnic unity, but in fact it 
has long been Russia’s “internal abroad”. The clearest 
expression of this development is its particular legal 
situation, which combines Islamic and traditional 
common-law rules with the whims of the head of the 
republic, and contradicts Russian legislation. 
By delegating the fight against the insurrection to 
Chechen security forces as of 2002, President Putin 
attempted to end the period of large-scale acts of war 
in the Caucasian republic. Critics of this “Chechenisa-
tion” claim that Akhmat Kadyrov and his son Ramzan 
were using it to bring about de facto secession, all 
the while proclaiming untiringly that Chechnya was 
a constituent of the Russian Federation. In so doing, 
critics say, the Kadyrovs were more successful than 
the armed separatist resistance to which they had 
both previously belonged. The Chechnya policy 
during Putin’s first term in office is the more remark-
able because it was contemporaneous with his devel-
opment of the so-called federal power vertical: events 
in and around Chechnya caused the Kremlin to re-
centralise political structures within the Russian 
Federation. Even some Russian experts now critically 
refer to this as “hyper-centralisation”. President Putin 
derived legitimacy for the recentralisation from the 
conflict with the Caucasian republic of Chechnya. 
A major step in this direction was the (temporary) 
abolition of regional gubernatorial elections follow-
ing the hostage crisis in the North-Caucasian town 
of Beslan in September 2004. More than 300 people 
were killed when Russian security forces stormed a 
school occupied by terrorists. 
Scholarly literature is divided on the merits of 
the “Chechenisation” policy. Some observers point 
to the transition from the period of large-scale armed 
violence to a more selective, more targeted and ulti-
mately more successful fight against the armed under-
ground by local security forces. For them, this tran-
sition succeeded in removing Chechnya from the 
top position in the North-Caucasus violence statistics. 
Others consider that the local political price of this 
security-policy victory was too high. The “stabilisation 
costs” that President Putin was willing to accept in 
this context include widespread human-rights viola-
tions in the Kadyrov republic, which Russian author-
ities have done nothing to check. The persecution 
and murder of homosexuals in Chechnya in 2017 
and the arrest of the national representative of the 
human-rights organisation Memorial in early 2018 
have brought these violations to the forefront of 
international politics and reporting as rarely before. 
The loyalty relationship between Kadyrov and his 
“feudal lord” Putin plays a decisive role in Chechnya’s 
position within the Russian Federation vis-à-vis the 
central-government level, which has been strengthened 
since the early 2000s. With regard to Putin’s fourth 
term in office, the question arises whether the Putin-
Kadyrov pact will continue to hold. 
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On 31 March 1992, after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, a federation treaty set out the division of power 
in post-Soviet Russia between the centre and the re-
gions or federal subjects. During his visit to the Tatar 
capital Kazan in the summer of 1990, Boris Yeltsin, 
the president of the then-Soviet Russian Federation 
(Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, RSFSR), 
had proclaimed: “Take as much sovereignty as you 
can digest.” In the period that followed, republics 
that had been Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics 
(ASSR) declared themselves sovereign political enti-
ties. They demanded autonomy and resolute feder-
alisation. The 1992 federation treaty sealed this 
process. A year later, Russia’s post-Soviet constitution 
was adopted; even then, it contained no explicit 
mention of the treaty. Moreover, two autonomous 
republics, Chechnya and Tatarstan, had not signed 
the treaty. Hardly anyone in Russia remembers that 
document today.1 
At the dawn of the post-Soviet era, the Russian 
Federation consisted of 89 regional entities. In the 
years that followed, mergers of several regions 
reduced that number to 83. Today, the multinational 
federal state consists of 85 federal subjects (including 
the Crimea, annexed in 2014 in violation of inter-
national law, and the city of Sevastopol). They are 
represented at the central government level by del-
egates on the federal council. The regions, including 
the autonomous republics, differ widely in socio-
economic development, size of economy and popu-
lation, ethnic composition, financial dependence on 
the federal budget, and other criteria.2 The majority 
 
1 Vadim Shtepa, The Devolution of Russian Federalism 
(Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 4 April 2017), 
https://jamestown.org/devolution-russian-federalism/. 
2 Alexander Libman, Russische Regionen. Sichere Basis oder 
Quelle der Instabilität für den Kreml?, SWP-Studie 19/2016 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2016); 
Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Regionale Diskrepanzen in Russ-
of regions is currently reliant on annual financial 
support. Only 14 regions count as net contributors. 
Among the net beneficiary regions (dotacionnye 
regiony), the largest autonomous republic in the North 
Caucasus, Dagestan, is first and Chechnya fifth.3 
Among the federal subjects, 22 republics have 
non-Russian titular nationalities. In some cases, these 
populations are smaller in number than the ethnic-
Russian populations. However, hardly any Russians 
still live in Chechnya or Dagestan. The areas of the 
Russian Federation that have attracted the attention 
of Russia specialists in the West are the North Cauca-
sus with its seven autonomous republics, from Ady-
gea near the Black Sea to Dagestan on the Caspian 
Sea; the Volga region including the autonomous 
republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan; and the 
Far East. 
President Vladimir Putin has initiated a process 
of recentralisation and expanded a “power vertical” 
limiting the federal subjects’ leeway for independent 
policy-making. An example of this interlocking with 
the central government is the dominant position of 
the governing party United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya) 
in the regional parliaments. Putin’s power vertical 
contrasts with his predecessor’s time in office. The 
early Yeltsin years in particular were characterised by 
a sometimes chaotic process of decentralisation and a 
“sovereignty parade” of autonomous republics and 
autonomous regional entities. 
Recentralisation began in 2000, when the govern-
ment created seven federal districts, which were 
 
land: Politisch verursacht (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung, 14 April 2014), http://www.bpb.de/internationales/ 
europa/russland/182692/analyse-regionale-diskrepanzen-in-
russland-politisch-verursacht. 
3 “Dagestan i Chechnja popali v pjaterku vysokodotacion-
nych regionov” [Dagestan and Chechnya came in the top five 
of the highly subsidised regions], Kavkazkii Uzel, 12 October 
2017, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/310951. 
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compared to the General Governorates of the Tsarist 
Empire. Two others have now joined: in January 2010 
the Northern Caucasus, which previously belonged to 
the larger Southern Federal District, was promoted to 
its own federal district; in 2014 annexed Crimea was 
also added to this category. The federal districts are 
run by special representatives of the Russian presi-
dent. Their main tasks include ensuring the concord-
ance of federal and regional legislation and control-
ling the federal authorities that are active regionally, 
such as tax authorities, the police or the domestic 
secret service, the FSB.4 The fact that Chechnya largely 
eludes such control makes it a true exception. 
Nineteen governors were forced to 
resign in 2017, in the largest wave of 
dismissals of the past five years. 
After the Beslan hostage crisis of 2004, direct 
elections of governors and heads of republic were 
abolished. Since then, they have been appointed by 
the Russian president. After mass protests against 
alleged fraud during the December 2011 elections to 
the Duma, the principle of direct regional elections 
was reintroduced, albeit with serious restrictions. 
Becoming a candidate for gubernatorial elections is 
now complicated by a “municipal filter”: prospective 
candidates first have to submit a set number of 
signatures of delegates from local and district coun-
cils and mayors in their favour. Moreover, the elected 
governor or head of republic can still be deposed by 
the Kremlin. Before regional elections in 2017, there 
were demands that the municipal filter – which had 
ensured the dominance of the governing party at the 
regional level – be made more democratic. Neverthe-
less, in September 2017 the filter once again served as 
an administrative tool to prevent independents from 
registering as candidates for gubernatorial elections 
in 16 regions.5 
 
4 Martin Russell, Russia’s Constitutional Structure. Federal in 
Form, Unitary in Function, (Strasbourg and Brussels: European 
Parliamentary Research Service [EPRS], Members’ Service 
Research, October 2015), 4. 
5 “In 8 out of 16 regions, non-systemic candidates failed 
to overcome the ‘municipal filter’ because of obstruction by 
local and regional authorities.” European Platform for Demo-
cratic Elections (EPDE), Analytical Report on the Administrative 
Control over the Procedure of Collecting Signatures of Deputies and 
Heads of Municipal Entities in Support of Candidates (“Municipal 
Filter”), Newsletter (Berlin, 10 August 2017), 1, http:// 
newsletter.epde.org/tl_files/EPDE/RESSOURCES/2017%20 
Within several months to go before the presiden-
tial elections in March 2018, Moscow further tightened 
its grip on governors and regional finances as part 
of a staff policy focusing on a generational change 
among the regional elites by replacing older “terri-
torial princes” with younger, easier-to-control tech-
nocrats from central institutions. Moscow has also 
tied the loans that it grants to the many indebted 
regions to conditions that restrict the latter’s leeway 
to decide their own financial policy.6 Nineteen gov-
ernors were forced to resign in 2017, in the largest 
wave of dismissals of the past five years.7 Simulta-
neously, Moscow has increasingly recruited non-local 
cadres to lead regions and republics. A striking 
example was in Chechnya’s neighbouring republic 
Dagestan. In October 2017, Ramazan Abdulatipov, 
the 71-year-old head of the republic, who had been in 
office since 2013, was replaced by Vladimir Vasilyev, 
a former high-ranking police officer from Moscow 
and deputy speaker in the Duma. For the first time 
since 1948, this placed a non-native at the helm of the 
largest republic in the North Caucasus.8 This move was 
rationalised not least by arguing that the new head 
of republic had no obligations to any one ethnic 
group or clan in Dagestan and would therefore be 
better able to lead the fight against corruption and 
clanish nepotism, which are particularly present 
there. However, some commentators see in this cadre 
policy the idea favoured by Russia’s patriotic circles 
of returning to the Tsarist practice of appointing gov-
ernors.9 
 
Golos%20Reports/Report_Russian_Election_Municipal_ 
Final.pdf. 
6 Fabian Burkhardt and Janis Kluge, Dress Rehearsal for 
Russia’s Presidential Election. Mosow Tightens Grip on Regional 
Governors and Budgets, SWP Comment 37/2017, (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2017), https:// 
www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/dress-rehearsal-for-
russias-presidential-election/ 
7 Maria Domańska, The Kremlin’s Regional Policy – a Year 
of Dismissing Governors, OSW Warsaw Commentary no. 257 
(Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies [Ośrodek Studiów 
Wschodnich, OSW], 15 December 2017). 
8 Denis Sokolov, “Pervyj prokurator Dagestana” [Dagestan’s 
first procurator], Vedomosti, 4 October 2017, http://www. 
vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2017/10/04/736464-prokurator-
dagestana. 
9 “Russian Pundit Puts New Dagestan Appointment in Con-
text”, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union Politi-
cal File, 11 October 2017. 
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The Kremlin has declared the defence against sepa-
ratism one of the greatest challenges for its national 
security policy. It is risky in today’s Russia to advocate 
real federalism and the right to regional self-deter-
mination: the authorities could interpret it as an 
appeal for separatism. In 2014 a law entered into force 
that encouraged this equation by prohibiting “calls 
to harm the territorial integrity of the Russian Federa-
tion. It has already led to criminal proceedings.10 
During the Second Chechen War, the fight against 
terrorism and Islamist extremism served to justify 
a renewed, large-scale military operation. At the 
regional level, the threat of ethno-nationalistic sepa-
ratism had declined by then. Sibirian regionalism, 
Finno-Ugric national movements in Karelia, and de-
mands for autonomy in Tatarstan never turned into 
serious secession movements. The Russia expert 
Marlène Laruelle doubts that the nationalisms of non-
Russian ethnic groups are still a “force for change” in 
today’s Russia, for the following reasons: in the North 
Caucasus, the region with the highest initial potential 
for secession, ethno-territorial separatism was over-
taken by Islamist dynamics within the armed under-
ground. In her assessment, the “sovereignty parade”, 
which had emerged at the dawn of the post-Soviet era 
through various national movements and popular 
fronts, is now largely a part of Russia’s past; today’s 
regional faultlines tend to be characterised by socio-
economic rather than ethnic differences.11 
At the military level, the National Guard (Ross-
gvardiya) created by President Putin in 2016 is seen as 
the most recent and striking institution of the power 
vertical. It reports directly to the president and groups 
existing structures of the security agencies, including 
the troops of the interior ministry and special units 
such as OMON and others. This kind of Pretorian 
guard had already been considered in the Yeltsin era, 
but was not established until recently.12 It now has 
a staff of about 400,000 men under the command of 
Putin’s close confidante, Viktor Zolotov, who was also 
appointed head of counterterrorism for the North 
 
10 “Putin Signs a Law Criminalizing Calls to Separatism”, 
The Moscow News, 30 December 2013. 
11 Marlene Laruelle, “Is Nationalism a Force for Change 
in Russia?”, Daedalus 146, no. 2 (2017): 89–100 (90). 
12 Margarete Klein, “Russlands neue Nationalgarde. Stär-
kung der Machtvertikale des Putin-Regimes”, Osteuropa 66, 
no. 5 (2016): 19–32; Pavel Luzin, “The Ominous Rise of 
Russian National Guard”, Intersection (Security), 21 July 2017, 
http://intersectionproject.eu/article/security/ominous-rise-
russian-national-guard. 
Caucasus in August 2017. In this context, there has 
been some discussion over whether the National 
Guard with its posts in Chechnya limits the (conspic-
uous) independence of the Chechen security bodies – 
and if so, to what extent.13 Some observers have inter-
preted this measure as a move against Kadyrov’s in-
clination to act on his own authority. Others see no 
limitations on his power since Chechen soldiers 
serving in the National Guard continue to be loyal 
to their territorial sovereign and are not deployed 
without his approval. They are led by Sharip Delim-
khanov, a younger brother of Adam Delimkhanov, 
who is considered Kadyrov’s right-hand man in the 
federal Duma in Moscow. The Delimkhanovs are 
Ramzan Kadyrov’s cousins. 
In 2017 the question of whether fed-
eralism can develop in Russia, and to 
what extent, gained in importance in 
domestic political discourse. 
In 2017 the question of whether federalism can 
develop in Russia, and to what extent, once more 
gained in importance in domestic political discourse. 
One trigger was the confrontation over extending the 
accord that gave the autonomous republic of Tatar-
stan a special relationship with the central govern-
ment. In the early 1990s, the Russian leadership had 
been challenged not only by the Chechen independ-
ence movement pushing for separation from Russia. 
Moscow was also confronted with emphatic demands 
for autonomy from the Tatar nationalist movement 
in the Volga region. The Tatars are the largest non-
Russian ethnic group in the Russian Federation. Like 
Chechnya, Tatarstan had not signed the 1992 federa-
tion treaty. However, unlike Chechnya, the autono-
mous republic – located not on the periphery but 
in the centre of Russia – focused on separate power-
sharing negotiations with the central government, 
rather than on secession. In 1994 an accord was 
signed to that end. It was extended for ten years in 
2007 and expired in July 2017. This special accord 
guaranteed Tatarstan a certain measure of political 
and economic autonomy, which has since been re-
stricted by Putin’s power vertical, but not eliminated 
 
13 Dmitry Shlapentokh, “The Kremlin’s Last Resort: 
Kadyrovtsi in Russia’s National Guard”, Central Asia-
Caucasus Analyst, 3 March 2017, http://www.cacianalyst.org/ 
publications/analytical-articles/item/13430-the-kremlin-last-
resort-kadyrovtsi-in-russias-national-guard.html. 
 The Development of the “Vertical of Power” 
 SWP Berlin 
 Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation 
 May 2018 
 11 
completely. Tatarstan has remained the only federal 
subject to have a president; all other autonomous 
republics have had that title replaced by the desig-
nation “head of republic”. Ironically, it was the auto-
cratic head of the Chechen republic, Kadyrov, who 
inspired this terminological change in 2010 by point-
ing out that there could only be one president in 
Russia, namely Vladimir Putin.14 Like Chechnya (but 
unlike other regions), Tatarstan also demanded the 
right to have its own foreign policy and foreign eco-
nomic relations. In the dispute between Russia and 
Turkey (2015-16), it was thus able to take a stance 
against the economic sanctions that Moscow had 
imposed on Ankara and insist on having its own 
relationship with Turkey. 
Before the power-sharing agreement expired in 
July 2017, demands were made for a renewed exten-
sion and a strengthening of federalism. There was 
talk of a new form of power-sharing and a “budgetary 
federalism” that would allow Tatarstan, which is eco-
nomically powerful compared to the North Caucasus, 
to keep the majority of its revenues. Against this 
background, there were also calls for compulsory 
teaching of the Tatar language at schools in Tatarstan 
and a Tatar-language TV channel to be broadcast 
nationwide since many Tatars live in other parts of 
Russia. These language-policy demands resonated to 
some extent with non-Russian titular nationalities in 
other regions.15 At the Tatar World Congress in early 
August 2017, which was attended by a thousand del-
egates from 40 countries, the first elected President 
of Tatarstan (1991–2010), Mintimer Shaimiev, gave 
a speech. He reminded his audience of the power-
sharing agreement, which he believed influenced 
 
14 “Chef ohne Präsidententitel: Kadyrov legt Treue-
bekenntnis zu Moskau ab – ‘Iswestija’”, Sputnik Deutschland, 
13 August 2010, https://de.sputniknews.com/politik/ 
20100813257098749/. 
15 Paul Goble, “Tatarstan’s Pursuit of Power-Sharing 
Accord with Moscow Energizes National Movements across 
Russia”, Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, 13 April 
2017; Ramazan Alpaut, “Stanet li tatarskij vtorym gosu-
darstvennym jazykom Rossii?” [Will Tatar become Russia’s 
second official language?], Kavkaz.Realii, 8 April 2017, 
http://www.kavkazr.com/a/stanet-li-tatarskiy-vtorym-
obshenatsionalnym/28416275.html?mc_cid=344420573e 
&mc_eid=9eaa49374d; Ruslan Gorevoj, “Iskushenie sepa-
ratizmom” [Temptation through separatism], Versiya, 
12 February 2017, https://versia.ru/tatarstan-mozhet-
sprovocirovat-rossijskie-regiony-na-novyj-parad-suve-
renitetov?mc_cid=344420573e&mc_eid=9eaa49374d. 
“the entire fate of Russia” and of Russian federalism. 
Its extension was a “historical necessity”; the parties 
needed to sit at the negotiating table to resolve legal 
issues and harmonise the regional and federal con-
stitutions. 
To date, the Kremlin has only granted one of these 
demands. It has allowed Rustam Minnikhanov, the 
head of the republic since 2010, to use the title of 
President until 2020, but rejected any extension to 
the special agreement with Tatarstan. Even the 
Tatar government only accepted some of the above-
mentioned concerns, and that cautiously. Russian 
organisations in the autonomous republic, 40 percent 
of whose population of 3.8 million (according to the 
2010 census) are ethnic Russians, indignantly rejected 
the cultural and linguistic demands.16 These demands 
certainly contradict the strengthening of the Russian 
language that President Putin has called for at all 
levels of the Federation.17 In late November 2017, 
Tatarstan ceded to Moscow’s pressure: being taught 
the Tatar language at school was not made compul-
sory.18 
The wave of resignations and new 
appointments of governors moved 
regional affairs into the spotlight. 
There were also disturbances below the national-
territorial level with its autonomous republics. The 
wave of resignations and new appointments of gov-
ernors moved regional affairs into the spotlight.19 
 
16 A Society for Russian Culture in Tatarstan complained 
to the minister of education and science in Moscow about 
the call for compulsory lessons in the Tatar language for 
all of the republic’s inhabitants. At least 50 percent of the 
region’s children, it said, would have to suffer through a 
useless subject – the Tatar language – at the expense of 
the Russian language and culture. “Russia: Tatarstan Media 
Highlights 28 August–3 September 2017”, BBC Monitoring 
Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union Political File, 10 September 
2017. 
17 “He has encouraged both ethnic Russians and Russian-
speaking members of other nations to come out in open oppo-
sition to non-Russian republican policies of language” Paul 
Goble, “Language Fight in Tatarstan Set to Ignite Political Ex-
plosion Across Russia”, Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, 19 September 2017. 
18 “Squeeze on Tatarstan Underlines Putin’s Bid to Central-
ise Control of Republics”, Financial Times, 26 January 2018. 
19 Andrey Pertsev, Russia’s New Old Wave of Technocratic 
Governors (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 3 March 2017), 
http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=68169. 
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Regional elites, for example, complained about 
their loss of influence and decision-making powers. 
According to a study by the Centre for Applied Stra-
tegic Research, whose director is the former Russian 
finance minister Alexei Kudrin, these are exclusively 
administrative elites behind the “political elites” able 
to influence political decisions and the “veto elites” 
able to correct such decisions. The importance of re-
gional economic elites has also decreased.20 Following 
the latest regional and gubernatorial elections in 
autumn 2017, Russian historians, economists and 
political scientists warned against “hyper-centralisa-
tion”, a division of Russia into “Moscow and Not-Mos-
cow” carried out in the name of safeguarding terri-
torial integrity.21 
There was resistance to the draft bill “On the 
State’s National Policy”, initiated by President Putin 
in 2016, and the binding definition of the “Russian 
nation” (rossiyskaya naciya). A definition had been 
needed since the start of Russia’s post-Soviet history. 
Policy had oscillated between three interpretations 
of national statehood: civic nationalism; ethno-
nationalism (here referring to Russianness); and neo-
imperialism.22 While Moscow pays lip service to civic 
nationalism, it has been more attached to the third 
variant during the Putin years. The definition was 
therefore supposed to be settled by legislation. De-
spite President Putin’s support and encouragement, 
however, the draft bill was shelved until further 
notice after five months of discussions. Its (provi-
sional) failure was due to the resistance of Russian 
nationalists, who wanted the law to set out the 
dominant status of ethnic Russians, and of non-Rus-
sian elites, who sensed an attempt to rob them of 
their privileges. 
Ideological and cultural tensions 
between the centre and the regions 
also exist concerning the 
representation of history. 
Ideological and cultural tensions between the 
centre and the regions also exist concerning the 
 
20 “Regional’nye elity priznali svoju otstranennost’ ot 
politiki” [Regional elites have noticed their alienation from 
politics], Vedomosti, 16 March 2017. 
21 Cf. Paul Goble, “Hyper-Centralization of Russia Threat-
ens Its Development and Survival”, Jamestown Foundation 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 19 October 2017. 
22 Igor Torbakov, “What Is To Be Done about the ‘Russian 
Question’?”, EurasiaNet, 27 October 2017. 
representation of history. In a return to the past, that 
representation is increasingly steered by state author-
ities, who are directing it towards a unitary narrative 
that exalts Russia as a great power. At a meeting in 
March 2015 with regional North Caucasus politicians, 
Moscow’s special envoy for the federal district accused 
local universities of falsifying history and questioned 
historical terms such as “anti-colonial resistance”. He 
also disapproved of exhibits in local museums dedi-
cated to native life before the region became part of 
Russia, supposedly glorifying that period.23 In recent 
years, there have been “monument conflicts” between 
the centre and periphery, in which ethnic Russians 
pay homage to Tsarist generals such as Aleksey Yer-
molov while North Caucasians commemorate their 
resistance fighters, including Imam Shamil.24 During 
Putin’s mandate, the policy on history has tended to 
challenge the notion of Russian colonialism, effec-
tively saying: We were never a colonial power like the 
Western powers, which attacked overseas territories 
and exploited them. In Ocober 2016, Russia’s security 
council called for a Centre to be established to protect 
against falsifications of Russian history, which it 
claimed were circulating in the West and former 
Soviet republics, for example “speculations on the 
colonial issue”.25 
Chechnya, which only two decades ago forged its 
place in the anti-colonial resistance to Russian domin-
ion, now corroborates the historical narrative sup-
ported by the Kremlin. Since 2011, for example, the 
Kadyrov regime no longer supports the commemora-
tion of the deportation of entire ethnic groups from 
the North Caucasus ordered by Stalin in 1943–1944, 
such as the Chechens and Ingush.26 
 
23 Valery Dzutsati, “History Widens the Divide between 
the North Caucasus and the Rest of Russia”, Jamestown 
Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, 30 March 2015. 
24 Paul Goble, “Russian Regions Erecting Statues to Those 
Who Resisted Muscovite Expansion”, Jamestown Foundation 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 14 March 2017. 
25 Cf. Alexander Morrison, “Russia’s Colonial Allergy”, 
EurasiaNet, 19 December 2016. 
26 Cf. this study’s chapter “Kadyrov’s Cultural Policy: 
Back to Chechen Tradition?”, below, p. 16. 
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At the regional level, another power vertical was 
developed in Chechnya by the Kadyrov dynasty, 
particularly Ramzan Kadyrov. It seems limitless and 
is thus an exception within Russia. The mayor of the 
republic’s capital Grozny, Muslim Khachiyev, has 
said: “Everything of any real significance that hap-
pens [in Chechnya] happens on Kadyrov’s watch. He 
is accountable for everything to the people, to God, 
and to the president [of Russia]”.27 
The head of the Chechen republic has repeatedly 
pointed out that except for President Putin nothing 
and no-one could limit or control his authority – 
neither parliament nor the media nor judicial mecha-
nisms, let alone the opposition. “We have no oppo-
sition. That’s a system to undermine state sovereignty 
[vlast]. I don’t allow anyone to play games with the 
people.”28 No political parties exist in Chechnya other 
than the governing party, United Russia. Consequently, 
as the governing party’s candidate in regional elec-
tions, Kadyrov receives almost 100 percent of the 
vote. The same is true of his feudal lord Putin. Chech-
nya occupies first place among the so-called electoral 
sultanates, i.e. about 15 regions in which the results 
obtained by Putin and the governing party in presi-
dential and parliamentary elections are far above the 
national average. 
As a reward for his loyalty to Putin, vassal Kadyrov 
gets to treat Chechnya as his personal fiefdom. He 
has threatened to open fire on police units from other 
parts of Russia if they operate in Chechnya without 
 
27 Quoted in “Chechen Strongman Builds Cult of Personality 
through Sport”, Financial Times, 4 August. 
28 Quoted in Il’ja Jashin, Ugroza nacional’noj bezopasnosti. 
Nezavisimij expertnyj doklad [Threat to national security. 
Lecture by an independent expert] (Moscow: Open Russia, 
February 2016), 12, https://openrussia.org/post/view/12965/. 
his authorisation. He uses collective punishment 
against his adversaries and persecutes them even out-
side of Chechnya. He also pursues a cultural and 
religious policy that, according to his critics, amounts 
to transforming the republic into an Islamic state.29 
Born in 1976, Ramzan Kadyrov fought on the side 
of the separatists against Russian troops in the first 
Chechen War (1994–1996). Thereafter, he served as 
body guard to his father Akhmat, who was the acting 
mufti of the de-facto independent republic. At the 
start of the second war in autumn 1999, both father 
and son defected to the side of the Russian security 
forces. During the chaotic phase from 1996 to 1999, it 
had become clear to the Kadyrovs that Chechnya was 
highly unlikely to win a renewed war against Russia. 
Once Russian troops had regained control over the 
renegade autonomous republic, President Putin pro-
moted Akhmat Kadyrov to be its ruler. The young 
Ramzan headed his father’s security apparatus, which 
became known as “Kadyrovtsy” and now numbers 
over 30,000 men. In March 2003 a new Chechen con-
stitution was passed by referendum, and entered into 
force a month later. It guarantees a measure of 
autonomy for the republic, but subordinates it to the 
Russian Federation and central government. During 
the questionable presidential election in the republic 
in October 2003, Moscow’s candidate Akhmat Kadyrov 
was elected with 80 percent of the votes cast. On 9 
May 2004 he was assassinated. His successor was in-
terior minister Alu Alkhanov, since Kadyrov’s son was 
still too young for the presidency. However, as Putin’s 
protégé, Ramzan climbed rapidly to become the de 
facto ruler. In March 2006 he was made prime minis-
ter and proceeded to fill most government and ad-
 
29 Georgy Bovt, “Will Moscow Allow Polygamy in Chech-
nya?”, The Moscow Times, 13 May 2015. 
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ministrative positions with his acolytes. In 2007 
Alkhanov resigned as president, and the office was 
assumed by Ramzan Kadyrov. 
A fundamental reason for the special status of 
the republic’s ruler is that the Kadyrovs, on Putin’s 
orders, helped to transform the phase of full-scale war 
violence in Chechnya into a more selective and more 
targeted fight against the adversary. The Second Che-
chen War was, like the First, characterised by devas-
tating violence. After Russian troops took Grozny 
in March 2000, the armed resistance withdrew to in-
accessible mountain regions and launched a partisan 
war against Russian forces. The Russian troops in turn 
proceeded with disproportionate force against entire 
cities and settlement areas, bombarding them with 
artillery, bombing them from the air, and carrying 
out massive punitive operations.30 However, their 
methods were ultimately unsuccessful. A Russian 
general reported from the battlefield in Chechnya 
as late as 2004 that the Russian army was primarily 
occupied with keeping its own troops safe and was 
unable to counter the guerrillas effectively.31 
Since 2002 the Kremlin has in-
creasingly relied on pro-Russian local 
paramilitary units under the ultimate 
command of the Kadyrovs 
Since 2002 the Kremlin has increasingly relied on 
pro-Russian local paramilitary units under the ulti-
mate command of the Kadyrovs, who have had first-
hand experience of guerrilla warfare as former 
resistance fighters against Russia. These local units, 
which integrated growing numbers of defectors from 
the insurgency,32 had more detailed knowledge than 
the Russian troops of the sociocultural terrain and 
of their adversaries’ modus operandi. Gradually, the 
Second Chechen War turned into a local civil war. 
 
30 Emil Aslan Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev, How Socio-
cultural Codes Shaped Violent Mobilization and Pro-insurgent Sup-
port in the Chechen Wars (Cham: Springer/Palgrave Macmillan, 
2017), 38. On Russian warfare, cf. Mark Galeotti, Russia’s 
Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009 (Oxford, 2014). 
31 Emil Aslan Souleimanov, The North Caucasus Insurgency: 
Dead or Alive? (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: The United States Army 
War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2017), 35. 
32 According to the then-ruler of the republic, Alu Alkha-
nov, in October 2005 half the local security forces already 
consisted of (about 7,000) former insurgents, who had de-
fected. John Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s War on Terror (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2007), 88. 
The Kadyrovtsy largely replaced the Russian troops 
as the leading force in fighting terrorists. Their main 
tool was collective punishment, which was not lim-
ited to close relatives of the remaining insurgents and 
terror suspects. The most common practice was to 
burn down houses. Ramzan Kadyrov’s punitive and 
deterrent measures also targeted the Chechen dias-
pora in Europe. 
According to a study from 2010, the targeted 
counter-insurgency practised by local security forces 
resulted in a 40 percent decrease in violent activities 
by the armed guerrillas compared to the Russian 
army’s methods.33 In 2009 Moscow officially lifted 
Chechnya’s special status as a counter-terrorism loca-
tion. In February 2010 a British delegation visited the 
Caucasian republic. It was led by Frank Judd, former 
rapporteur for the Council of Europe on the human-
rights situation in Chechnya. The delegation reported 
that people living in Chechnya were noticeably safer 
than during the war, but that the human-rights 
situation continued to be precarious.34 
Once the fiercest phase of military confrontation 
had come to an end, violence levels in Chechnya 
did decline. However, simultaneously the Islamist 
revolutionary movement spread to other parts of 
the North Caucasus. In 2007 the last Chechen under-
ground president, Doku Umarov, proclaimed the so-
called Caucasus Emirate. While it never ruled over a 
compact territory, it did make efforts to coordinate 
local underground cells (jama’at) in various parts of 
the North Caucasus and motivate them ideologically. 
Fighting throughout the entire region has only de-
clined since about 2013, with markedly fewer casual-
ties. This was primarily due to many jihadi fighters 
moving from the Caucasus and other parts of Russia 
to combat zones in Syria and Iraq.35 
Field studies have raised doubts about the loyalty 
of the Chechen people to the head of their republic – 
and even of some Kadyrovtsy to their commander. 
Jean-François Ratelle and Emil Aslan Souleimanov 
 
33 Jean-François Ratelle and Emil Aslan Souleimanov, 
“A Perfect Counterinsurgency? Making Sense of Moscow’s 
Policy of Chechenisation”, Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 8 (2016): 
1287–1341 (1289); Jason Lyall, “Are Coethnics More Effec-
tive Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen 
War”, American Political Science Review 104, no. 1 (2010): 1–20. 
34 Quoted in “British MPs ‘Disturbed’ by Chechnya Visit”, 
The Moscow News, 25 February 2010. 
35 Uwe Halbach, Russland und der Nordkaukasus im Umfeld 
des globalen Jihadismus, SWP-Aktuell 23/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2017). 
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conducted interviews from 2008 to 2013 in which 
some interlocutors complained, for example, that 
only towns and localities linked to the Kadyrov clan 
had profited from the reconstruction programmes 
in Chechnya.36 At the same time, the two researchers 
concede that Putin’s Chechenisation policy and his 
alliance with the Kadyrov family have been remark-
ably successful. For them, the Russian president has 
attained three fundamental objectives: first, war 
casualties among the population declined. Second, 
transferring the counter-insurgency fight to the Kady-
rovtsy helped Moscow to distance itself from the 
battlefield of Chechnya and the violence committed 
against local civilians, and thus to avoid accusations 
of human-rights violations. Third, Kadyrov actually 
managed to drive back the insurgency – unlike, for 
example, the leader of the neighbouring republic 
of Dagestan. Moreover, they believe that Kadyrov, 
despite taking the law entirely in his own hands in 
Chechnya, has remained loyal to the Russian presi-
dent.37 
Whether it is possible to thereby derive lasting 
stability is questionable. Two instruments used by the 
Kadyrovs in fighting the insurgency make this par-
ticularly doubtful, namely collective punishment and 
vendetta, which have historically played a role in tri-
bal Chechen society.38 
Chechen society is still traumatised 
by the two wars; there were casualties 
in almost every family. 
Russian human-rights activists and regional ex-
perts, such as Ekaterina Sokiryanskaya, Svetlana Gan-
nushkina and Aleksei Malashenko, believe that ele-
ments of Chechen youth are receptive to Islamic State 
(IS) propaganda because Chechnya is not at all lastingly 
 
36 “Moscow has managed to maintain control over the 
Chechen state in general and Chechen elites in particular. 
[…] Unlike in Afghanistan and Iraq, where sectarian division 
and the empowerment of local ethnic allies have delivered 
mixed results for the US Army, Chechenisation represents a 
model where Moscow has been able to find the right balance 
between autonomy and control.” Ratelle and Souleimanov, 
“A Perfect Counterinsurgency?” (see note 33), 1310. 
37 Ibid. 
38 “Krovnaja mest’ – kak teper’ ubivajut na Kavkaze” 
[Vendetta: How murders are carried out in the Caucasus 
today], Kavkazkii Uzel, 26 December 2017, http://www.kavkaz-
uzel.eu/articles/296137/. 
pacified, as the official interpretation suggests.39 
Chechen society is still traumatised by the two wars; 
there were casualties in almost every family. Even 
though today’s minors did not experience the wars 
themselves, the trauma is being passed down to them 
by their parents’ generation. The shiny new facades 
in the capital Grozny cannot belie the fact that a large 
part of the population lives at or below the poverty 
threshold. Kadyrov’s acolytes, on the other hand, can 
display their wealth and luxury unhindered. “There 
are those for whom everything is allowed. And there’s 
the mass of the people who have no rights at all, [...] 
who have to gather in public to support the govern-
ment, who have to follow their religion in the way 
prescribed by the regime.”40 The experts emphasise, 
however, that even under these circumstances there 
is no large-scale support for IS. They stress that the 
limited potential followers are recruited not only 
from underprivileged social strata, and instead have a 
more complex social and educational profile. Accord-
ing to statements by the Chechen interior minister, 
in 2017 there were eight IS “sleeper cells” discovered 
and 18 underground fighters killed.41 
 
39 “Eksperty nazvali prichiny interesa chechenskoj mo-
lodezhi k ideologii IG” [Experts give the reasons for Chechen 
youths’ interests in IS ideology], Kavkazkii Uzel, 15 March 
2017, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/299244/. 
40 Quotation by Yekaterina Sokiryanskaya, ibid. 
41 “Russia: Chechnya Media Highlights 15–28 January 
2018”, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union 
Political File, 1 February 2018. 
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Ramzan Kadyrov insists that Chechnya is part and 
parcel of the Russian Federation and, more than any 
other regional leader, promotes a cult of President 
Putin, whom he has asked to remain in power for life. 
In Grozny, Putin’s birthday is celebrated by a mass 
parade. Ramzan Kadyrov has promoted the Russian 
President (alongside his father Akhmat and himself) 
to a state icon. In Chechen society, this tripartite 
iconology is satirically known as “Father, Son and the 
Holy Spirit”. The father, Akhmat Kadyrov, is at the 
pinnacle of this personality cult – comparable to 
Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan, the father of the current 
president Ilham Aliyev. Azerbaijan and Chechnya are 
the two political entities in the post-Soviet area in 
which authoritarian ruling families have established 
themselves as dynasties. The largest mosque in the 
whole North Caucasus stands in the Chechen capital 
Grozny. Not only the mosque has been named after 
the former mufti and head of the republic, Akhmat 
Kadyrov, but so have streets and buildings in Grozny 
and other localities in the republic. In 2017 the 
father-figure cult was further bolstered: the Chechen 
football club RFK Terek Grozny, which plays in the 
top Russian league, was renamed FK Akhmat Grozny. 
The 66th birthday of its namesake was celebrated in 
the capital on 22 August 2017 – with the participa-
tion of former colleagues and representatives from 
parliament, public organisations and the muftiate 
clergy. The guest of honour from Moscow was the 
Minister for North Caucasus Affairs, Lev Kuznetsov.42 
During the celebrations, Ramzan Kadyrov addressed 
the Islamic world: prominent Islam scholars from 
dozens of countries had acknowledged that his father 
had sacrificed his life for God and the salvation of 
the Chechen people. However, international terrorists 
were preparing to sacrifice the Chechen people to 
 
42 A ministry specifically dedicated to North Caucasus 
affairs (Minkavkaz) was established in Moscow in March 
2014.  
bring about the breakup of Russia.43 In the past few 
years, Kadyrov has repeatedly claimed that Western 
actors are undermining his republic’s stability and 
Russia’s territorial integrity. 
Ramzan Kadyrov organises his own personality cult 
through manliness rituals, martial-arts performances 
in which his sons occasionally participate, and other 
bizarre means. In February 2013 he set up his own 
Instagram page, on which he posted comments on 
Chechnya, Russia and the rest of the world. His on-
line audience grew to over 4 million visitors. How-
ever, as of 23 December 2017, access to Kadyrov’s 
Instagram and Facebook pages was no longer pos-
sible. They were blocked three days after the US gov-
ernment had put Kadyrov on its sanctions list under 
the Magnitsky Act for human-rights abuses.44 The 
measure triggered indignant reactions not only in 
Chechnya, but all over Russia.45 
Kadyrov cultivates the image of a helper to those 
in need not only in his own territory but all across 
Russia. He has boasted of helping free Russian jour-
nalists held in Ukraine, and members of the Russian 
marine imprisoned in Libya. In 2017 he became in-
volved in the repatriation of Russian women and 
children stranded in IS territories conquered by Iraqi 
and Syrian troops. From August to October 2017 alone, 
Kadyrov’s special envoy to the Middle East and North 
Africa, Ziyad Sabsazi, brought back about 50 of them 
 
43 “Russia: Chechnya Media Highlights 21–27 August 
2017”, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union 
Political File, 3 September 2017. 
44 The “Magnitsky Act” was passed by the US Congress 
in 2012 and signed by President Obama. It placed Russian 
officials on a sanctions list whom it held responsible for the 
death of the tax accountant Sergei Magnitsky, who had been 
arrested in 2009 and died in prison.  
45 “Chechen Leader’s Social Media Ban Causes Outrage 
in Russia”, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union 
Political File, 25 December 2017. 
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from the war zones.46 Kadyrov’s carefully cultivated 
image is popular in Russia’s interior, even though 
its inhabitants have reservations about Chechens and 
other North Caucasians. In an opinion poll carried 
out by the WZIOM Institute among 1,800 citizens 
of Russia in April 2017, 55 percent of those polled 
believed that Kadyrov’s activities benefited the entire 
country. The institute’s director, Valeri Fedorov, sum-
marised the poll results as follows: “The head of the 
Chechen republic is viewed by the majority of Rus-
sian citizens as a successful and patriotic leader who 
guarantees the security and development of his re-
public within the Russian population. Critical objec-
tions to Ramzan Kadyrov barely resonate in the mass 
consciousness.”47 
Within his sphere of control, Kadyrov rigidly steers 
his course in religious and cultural policy under the 
motto “Back to Chechen tradition”. This “Kadyrovism” 
builds bridges between different groups, including 
some that were previously hostile to each other, with 
different interpretations of “Chechen identity”: tra-
ditionalists who want to revive the norms of the com-
mon law (adat) that has been valid for centuries with-
in a tribal society; Islamic purists who only recognise 
sharia as a legal system; nationalists who insist on 
Chechnya’s sovereignty, basing themselves on the 
tradition of anti-colonial resistance; and autonomists 
who prefer a self-determined Chechnya within great-
power Russia.48 In this context, Ramzan Kadyrov 
presents himself as the national and religious leader; 
as the intermediary between Russia and the external 
Islamic world; as the symbol of Chechen self-deter-
mination and simultaneously as the guarantor of the 
republic’s affiliation with Russia; as an active fighter 
against terrorism and religious extremism who never-
theless employs violent methods himself and dictates 
strict religious prescriptions to his own society. 
 
46 “Russia: Chechnya Media Highlights 31 July–6 August 
2017”, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union 
Political File, 7 August 2017; Grozny-Inform, 21 October 2017. 
On Kadyrov’s activities abroad and his special envoy Sabsazi, 
cf. this study’s chapter on “Chechnya as a Cross-Border 
Actor”, p. 26. 
47 “Ramzan Kadyrov: Portret Politika”, press release 
no. 3372, VCIOM, 12 May 2017, https://wciom.ru/index.php? 
id=236&uid=116195. 
48 Cf. in particular Marlène Laruelle, Kadyrovism: Hardline 
Islam as a Tool of the Kremlin?, Russie.Nei.Visions no. 99 (Paris 
and Brussels: Institut français des relations internationales 
[Ifri], March 2017), 9. 
Kadyrov emphasises the proximity 
of Islamic morals and tradition to 
Russia’s Christian-Orthodox 
traditionalism. 
These contradictions are particularly visible in his 
religious policy. On the one hand, Kadyrov emphasises 
the proximity of Islamic morals and tradition to Rus-
sia’s Christian-Orthodox traditionalism and vehement-
ly demarcates this link from “Western decadence, un-
godliness, and hostility to tradition and the family”. 
Here he resembles his patron Putin, who since 2012 
(during his third term as president) has increasingly 
underpinned Russian patriotism with references to 
traditional values, and stressed their importance for 
Russia’s security and stability.49 Kadyrov supports the 
concept of “spiritual security”, which has been inte-
grated into Russia’s national security doctrine, elevat-
ing a specific “Russian civilisation” into an object to 
be defended against external interference.50 He main-
tains contacts with Patriarch Kirill and has opened 
new Russian-Orthodox churches in Chechnya despite 
the fact that the ethnic Russian section of its popu-
lation has shrunk to a tiny minority. Simultaneously 
Kadyrov supports ultraconservative forces in Moscow, 
such as the deputy Natalia Poklonskaya and orthodox 
hardliners that even the Patriarch considers suspect. 
They include groups that campaigned against the film 
Matilda in 2017, whose theme is the love affair be-
tween Tsar Nicolas II and a ballet dancer, for allegedly 
violating the religious sentiments of “real Russians”. 
Chechnya’s policy towards non-traditional faith 
communities is just as repressive as Moscow’s. Russia 
passed a law in July 2016 that places the missionary 
activities of non-Orthodox, non-traditional denomina-
tions under suspicion of terrorism. In 2017 Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in particular were criminalised as “reli-
gious extremists”. In Chechnya, the attribute “non-
traditional” is likewise used to demonise undesired 
religious activities. Ramzan Kadyrov calls for “tradi-
tional Islam” in line with his father Akhmat’s beliefs, 
invoking in Marlène Laruelle’s words “an often gro-
 
49 Cf. Irina du Quenoy, “Russia: The Stability Implications 
of State Policies Toward Religion and the Russian Orthodox 
Church”, in Religion, Conflict, and Stability in the Former Soviet 
Union, ed. Katya Migacheva and Bryan Frederick (Santa 
Monica: Rand Corporation, 2018), 159–80 (171–75). 
50 Cf. Veera Laine and Iiris Saarelainen, Spirituality as a 
Political Instrument. The Church, the Kremlin, and the Creation of 
the “Russian World”, Working Paper (Helsinki: Finnish Insti-
tute of International Affairs [FIIA], September 2017). 
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tesque reinterpretation of Sufi tradition”.51 While 
pilgrimages to the tombs of local saints and Sufi 
leaders were tolerated in Soviet times as an expres-
sion of national-religious folklore, they are now 
deliberately being revived. At the centre of these 
efforts is the tomb of Kunta-Haji Kishiev who has 
been elevated to the shining light of Chechnya’s 
religious history. This 19th-century leader of the 
Qadiriyya order had opposed Imam Shamil’s call to 
fight the Russian army “to the last man”, advocating 
a return to religious contemplation instead. 
Kadyrov has decreed rigid norms of 
behaviour that could be borrowed 
straight from the cultural repertoire 
of his adversaries in the Islamist-
Salafist underground. 
On the other hand, Kadyrov has decreed rigid norms 
of behaviour that could be borrowed straight from 
the cultural repertoire of his adversaries in the Islam-
ist-Salafist underground. At the centre of this policy 
are prescriptions – for instance regarding dress 
codes – that especially restrict the personal rights 
of women. As early as 2006, when he was still prime 
minister, he launched a morality campaign that 
contained the obligation to wear a headscarf as well 
as general dress rules for women, approved Islamic 
polygamy and justified “honour killings”. The con-
sumption of alcohol is strictly controlled; Western 
music has been banned from local TV channels since 
2008; and a liberal approach to sexual minorities 
(Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, LGBT), whose 
existence in Chechnya is simply denied, is seen as 
an expression of “Western decadence”.52 
Ilya Yashin, an ally of the murdered oppposition 
politician Boris Nemtsov made an exaggerated criti-
cism of this “Islamisation from above” within Chech-
nya in a lecture in February 2016: “Few people have 
noticed that in the past few years we have had our 
own local Islamic State take shape on Russian terri-
tory. A ‘Chechen caliphate’ operates according to its 
own traditions and laws, all the while receiving bil-
lions in subsidies out of the federal budget. Chech-
nya’s ruler, Ramzan Kadyrov, indulges in a luxurious 
lifestyle and steers a policy in which a few sharia 
 
51 Laruelle, Kadyrovism (see note 48), 20. 
52 Cf. this study’s chapter on “Human-Rights Violations”, 
p. 21. 
norms have gained the upper hand over Russia’s 
laws, and he is expanding his military might.”53 
However, a few of Kadyrov’s cultural and historical 
measures intended to embed Chechen nationalism 
in Russian patriotism have irritated Chechens. In 
2011 in accordance with the Kremlin’s history policy, 
he declared 23 February a national holiday. In Russia, 
this is the Day of the Defender of the Fatherland, when 
the armed forces are celebrated. However, Chechens 
link it to a different event. During Stalin’s Reign of 
Terror, 23 February 1944 saw the start of the depor-
tation of hundreds of thousands of Chechens and 
Ingush to Kazakhstan. Many deportees died on the 
way. Kadyrov moved the memorial service dedicated 
to this historical trauma to 10 May, the anniversary 
of his father Akhmat’s death. Moreover, he ques-
tioned the significance of commemorating the depor-
tation by making confusing remarks, including the 
claim that the deportees were in part to blame for 
their fate.54 
 
53  Il’ja Jashin, Ugroza nacional’noj bezopasnosti. Nezavisimij 
expertnyj doklad [Threat to national security. Lecture by an 
independent expert] (Moscow: Open Russia, February 2016), 
12, https://openrussia.org/post/view/12965/. 
54 “Zhiteli Chechni ne soglasny vosprinimat’ 23 Fevralja 
kak prazdnik” [The inhabitants of Chechnya do not agree 
with 23 February as a national holiday], Kavkazkii Uzel, 23 
February 2017, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/298193/. 
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During the past few years, some security personnel 
(siloviki) within Putin’s entourage, and especially with-
in the domestic secret service FSB, have criticised 
Chechnya for its lawlessness and for thwarting inves-
tigations by federal authorities.55 In 2013 several FSB 
officers went on hunger strike in protest against the 
release of three Chechen policemen accused of kid-
napping and torturing a man living in Moscow.56 In 
April 2015 the Stavropol police pursued a Chechen 
national in Grozny whose name was on its wanted 
list, but did not inform the Chechen authorities 
of their operation. In response, Kadyrov authorised 
his security apparatus to shoot anyone who was 
operating on the republic’s territory without prior 
permission from the local authorities. Chechen 
representatives in the State Duma and the Federal 
Council in Moscow supported their republic’s leader 
and accused the Russian interior ministry of provo-
cation. However, the ministry justified deploying the 
Stavropol police, leaving Kadyrov to backtrack and 
signal that there was no conflict. “I am a Kremlin 
man, I am Putin’s man, I am a servant of the people.”57 
Commentators who are sceptical about the person-
al loyalty pact between President Putin and his “foot 
soldier” in Chechnya have pointed to a series of mur-
ders of Kadyrov’s critics and opponents that have 
never been solved by Russian law-enforcement agen-
 
55 One of the best-known Russian experts on the Caucasus, 
Alexei Malaschenko from the Carnegie Moscow Center, com-
ments: “From what I can see, there has always been friction 
between Kadyrov and the federal forces, because Kadyrov 
only answers to Putin. This has irked people, especially since 
Putin awarded him the Order of Honor.” Quoted in Ivan 
Nechepurenko, “Nemtsov Probe Exposes Widening Rift 
between Kadyrov, FSB”, The Moscow Times, 11 March 2015. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Why Kadyrov Has Fought 
with Bastrykin”, North Caucasus Weekly, 30 April 2015, https:// 
jamestown.org/program/why-kadyrov-has-fought-with-
bastrykin/. 
cies. These include the assassination of the journalist 
Anna Politkovskaya in 2006, human-rights activist 
Natalya Estemirova in 2009, and Ruslan Yamadayev, 
shot dead in his car in central Moscow, in 2008. There 
have also been assassinations abroad, for example 
Sulim Yamadayev, who was killed in Dubai in 2009. 
The Yamadayev brothers were some of Kadyrov’s 
fiercest rivals. One of Kadyrov’s former body guards, 
Umar Israilov, who had reported human-rights viola-
tions, was killed in Vienna in 2009 after fleeing there 
with his family. “The FSB hate Ramzan because they 
are unable to control him”, said Aleksei Malashenko 
from the Carnegie Moscow Center. “He does whatever 
he wants, including in Moscow. Nobody can arrest 
members of his team if there is no agreement with 
Putin.” The prominent Russian opposition politician 
Boris Nemtsov joined this criticism. 
The most spectacular episode is the events sur-
rounding the murder of Nemtsov, who was shot on 
27 February 2015 near the Kremlin in Moscow. There 
was evidence pointing to Chechnya. Shortly after 
the assassination, five Chechens were arrested and 
a sixth, who resisted arrest, was shot dead. Kadyrov 
defended the suspects on Instagram and blamed 
“enemies of Russia” for masterminding the murder. 
On his website, he described one of the main suspects 
as a “true patriot”. Ruslan Geremeyev, suspected by 
Moscow of being involved in the attack, was kept 
away from investigators in Chechnya. He is allegedly 
close to Kadyrov’s most important ally and relative 
in Moscow, the Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov. 
Given these events, it is interesting that only a few 
days after the assassination of Nemtsov, Kadyrov was 
awarded two medals. On 9 March Putin bestowed on 
him the Order of Honor, Russia’s highest state deco-
ration; and on 16 March he received the Medal for 
Loyalty and Performance of One’s Duties from the 
authorities in Crimea (which had been annexed by 
Russia the previous year). 
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On 14 July 2017 the Moscow Military District Court 
delivered its verdict in the Nemtsov case. It sentenced 
the five Chechens to long terms in prison and catego-
rised the attack as a contract killing. However, it 
shone no light on the motive or on who might have 
backed or ordered the killing. According to an expla-
nation popular in Chechnya, the man who allegedly 
fired the fatal shot, Zaur Dadaev, was deeply religious 
and very upset by the caricatures of the Prophet pub-
lished in the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo 
and by those defending freedom of opinion after 
the terror attack on the magazine’s editorial office 
in January 2015. However, it remains unclear which 
statements by Nemtsov are supposed to have provided 
the motive for the killing. His fellow activist Ilya 
Yashin has clarified that Nemtsov “never said a bad 
word about Islam” and only criticised terrorists.58 
Furthermore, a number of human-rights activists 
doubted that the evidence was sufficient to convict 
the five accused, who were reportedly mistreated 
in detention and later withdrew their confessions. 
 
58 Friedrich Schmidt, “Ein passendes Geständnis”, Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 March 2015, 5. 
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European institutions and international human-rights 
organisations view the situation of civil and human 
rights in Russia as problematic overall. This is true, 
for instance, of the European Union’s annual report 
“Human Rights and Democracy 2016” published in 
October 2017, which Russia’s foreign ministry typi-
cally rejected as “not objective” and “Russophobic”.59 
Reports by international organisations on the human-
rights situation in the Russian Federation and specif-
ically in the North Caucasus highlight Chechnya 
in particular.60 Since it has been ruled by Ramzan 
Kadyrov, the systematic documentation of human-
rights violations has been prevented there. Two 
prominent human-rights activists were murdered in 
Chechnya in 2009: the internationally known Natalya 
Estemirova, who worked for the non-governmental 
organisation Memorial, and Sarema Sadulaeva from 
the humanitarian organisation Save the Next Gene-
ration. Any available information on human-rights 
abuses and violations committed by the state is con-
sequently unclear. What sparse information there is 
comes from those affected, who have contacted the 
Internet portal Kavkazkii Uzel (Caucasian Knot) or 
organisations such as Memorial.61 
The most common human-rights violations include 
the “disappearing” of alleged members of the armed 
underground and their relatives, torture in prisons 
and secret locations, arbitrary violence against Kady-
rov’s adversaries and their persecution abroad, as well 
as large-scale infringements of women’s rights. From 
1999 to 2017 approximately 3,000 people disappeared 
without trace in Chechnya. Between January and 
October 2017, there were 43 cases of family members 
 
59 “Moscow Condemns ‘Russophobic’ EU Rights Report”, 
BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union Political File, 
27 October 2017. 
60 See, e.g., Manarsha Isaeva, Sergej Prokopkin and Sarah 
Reinke, Die Menschenrechtslage in den nordkaukasischen Republiken 
Dagestan, Tschetschenien und Inguschetien, Menschenrechtsreport 
no. 68 (Göttingen: Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker, Novem-
ber 2012). 
61 Ibid., 21. 
reporting the kidnapping of relatives to the police.62 
In Dagestan and Ingushetia, there are active human-
rights organisations, and the families of kidnap 
victims go to local law-enforcement agencies for help. 
In Chechnya, by contrast, people only rarely dare to 
report the disappearance of relatives to the police. 
The Russian Federation’s Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Tatyana Moskalkova, travelled to Chechnya 
in 2017, but was unable to obtain much reliable 
information on kidnapping cases. 
In March 2017 there were reports of a wave of 
persecutions against homosexuals in the Kadyrov 
republic. Hundreds of people were arrested, some 
murdered. Not one of those arrested had publicly 
come out as homosexual. Yet in a society that has 
close family ties within village and clan communities, 
it is almost impossible for an individual to conceal 
that his or her sexual orientation diverges from tra-
ditional norms. According to the Russian newspaper 
Novaya Gazeta, this was a “prophylactic cleansing” 
following a request by representatives of the Russian 
LGBT community for authorisation to hold demon-
strations for the rights of sexual minorities in four 
locations in the North Caucasus. A Kadyrov spokes-
man denied the reports, saying it was impossible to 
arrest people that did not exist in the republic. If such 
people existed in Chechnya, he continued, their own 
relatives would send them to places from which they 
could never return.63 Kadyrov reacted similarly to the 
case of the Chechen singer Zelimkhan Bakaev, who 
disappeared without a trace in 2017, for which some 
sources blame state agencies. At a meeting with local 
officials in January 2018, Kadyrov said Bakaev was 
 
62 “Pochishcheniya ljudej v Chechne prinjali sistemnyj 
charakter” [The kidnapping of people in Chechnya has 
become systemic], Kavkazkii Uzel, 27 October 2017, http:// 
www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/311657/. 
63 Andrew E. Kramer, “Gay Men in Chechnya Are Killed, 
Paper Says”, The New York Times, 2 April 2017; “‘Hundreds’ 
Detained for Homosexuality in Chechnya”, BBC Monitoring 
Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union Political File, 1 April 2017. 
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probably homosexual and therefore killed by his 
relatives or men from his village.64 
Chechen security agencies have reportedly estab-
lished secret prisons in at least two locations for 
“people of non-traditional sexual orientation”. Rus-
sian journalists have filed critical reports about 
human-rights violations against homosexuals in 
Chechnya, resulting in threats from those in power 
there. The republic’s mufti, Salah Meshiev, and a 
member of the Chechen parliament demanded that 
the journalists be held to account. The Minister for 
Nationalities Policy, External Relations, Press and 
Information, Dshambulat Umarov, described the 
reporting as an “insult to the Chechen people” and 
called on the journalists to apologise in writing. As a 
result, more than 60 writers from Russia – including 
such world-renowned authors as Lyudmila Ulitskaya 
and Vladimir Voinovich – sided with the journalists 
and appealed to the country’s law-enforcement agen-
cies to react to the threats from Chechnya.65 Of all 
the serious human-right violations committed under 
Kadyrov’s reign of violence, this event created the 
most waves on the international stage. The foreign 
ministers of five countries expressed their concerns 
in a letter to their Russian colleague Sergey Lavrov. 
The President of the European Parliament, Antonio 
Tajani, and the OSCE also criticised the human-rights 
violations against sexual minorities in Russia and par-
ticularly in Chechnya.66 German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel addressed the abuses during her meeting with 
President Putin in early May 2017.67 In response to 
the protests, Moscow for the first time examined the 
accusations against Chechen security forces. However, 
an investigative committee responsible for the North 
 
64 “Chechen Leader Defends Detention of Rights Activist”, 
BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union Political File, 
18 January 2018. 
65 “Pisateli prizvali k rassledovaniju ozvuchennych v 
Chechne ugroz zhurnalistam” [Writers call for investigation 
of the threat against journalists coming from Chechnya], 
Kavkazkii Uzel, 17 April 2017, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/ 
articles/301165/. 
66 “Glava Evroparlamenta prizval vlasti Chechni projasnit’ 
situaciju s gejami” [The President of the European Parlia-
ment calls on Chechnya’s authorities to take a stance on 
the situation of homosexuals], Kavkazkii Uzel, 6 April 2017, 
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/300533/. 
67 “Merkel’ poprosila Putina zashchitit’ prava men’shinstv” 
[Merkel asked Putin to protect the rights of minorities], Kav-
kazkii Uzel, 2 May 2017, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/ 
302040/. 
Caucasus encountered resistance from the Chechen 
authorities.68 Chechnya’s human-rights ombudsman 
insisted in his in remarks from 23 May 2017 that 
homosexuality did not exist in the republic. He 
claimed that the whole dispute over the alleged per-
secution of homosexuals was the result of a conspiracy 
by foreign powers intending to undermine Chechen 
society.69 His counterpart in Moscow, Tatyana Moskal-
kova, pointed out that she had not yet received any 
requests for help from the victims and made clear 
that the victims’ families would need to be guaran-
teed maximum protection. This was the precondition, 
she said, for any serious investigations to be carried 
out in Chechnya at all.70 
In early 2018 the precarious human-
rights situation in Chechnya once 
again made the headlines in 
international politics. 
In early 2018 the precarious human-rights situa-
tion in Chechnya once again made the headlines in 
international politics. In January the human-rights 
activist Oyub Titiev, who had been running the Groz-
ny office of the organisation Memorial since Natalya 
Estemirova’s murder, was arrested for alleged posses-
sion of drugs. This is a favourite regime pretext for 
silencing its critics. In 2014 a court sentenced the 
activist Ruslan Kutaev to four years in prison for 
alleged possession of heroin. He had organised a con-
ference for the 70th anniversary of the deportation 
of Chechens and Ingush against Kadyrov’s wishes. In 
2016 a journalist from the Internet portal Kavkazkii 
Uzel (Caucasian Knot), who had posted reports criti-
cising the Kadyrov regime, was sentenced to three 
years’ imprisonment for alleged possession of mari-
juana. 
The German government, Council of Europe and 
EU expressed their concern about this renewed state 
interference in the reporting on human rights in 
Chechnya. The State Department in Washington de-
scribed Titiev’s arrest as “the latest in a string of 
reports of alarming recent human rights violations 
 
68 Ann-Dorit Boy, “Tschetscheniens Polizei sabotiert Unter-
suchung”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 26 May 2017. 
69 “Chechen Ombudsman Rejects Gay Abuse Allegations”, 
BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union Political File, 
23 May 2017. 
70 Boy, “Tschetscheniens Polizei sabotiert Untersuchung” 
(see note 68). 
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in Chechnya”.71 Prior to that, in December 2017, the 
US government had added Kadyrov to the sanctions 
list under the Magnitsky Act, citing various human-
rights violations in his territory. Kadyrov responded 
to the criticism by vilifying Memorial employees as 
agitators steered by the US and defaming human-
rights activists in general as persons “without family, 
nation or religion” and as “enemies of the people”.72 
Concerns grew over the human-rights situation in 
Chechnya and the North Caucasus more generally 
when, shortly after Kadyrov’s response, an arson 
attack was carried out on the Memorial office in 
Nazran in the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia. 
Human-rights activists in Ingushetia had previously 
not had the same problems with the authorities as 
in Chechnya. The Dagestani capital Makhachkala also 
saw attacks on Memorial. This fed speculation as to 
whether the Kadyrovtsy’s repression reached beyond 
the borders of Chechnya.73 Human-rights organisa-
tions such as Memorial are currently under increasing 
pressure in Russia in general. 
 
71 Quoted in Sophia Kishkovsky, “Chechen Arrest Reflects 
Crackdown, Activists Say”, The New York Times, 11 January 
2018. 
72 Quoted in Benjamin Triebe, “Offensive gegen Bürger-
rechtler in Tschetschenien”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 22 January 
2018; “Evrosojuz osudil presledovanie PC ‘Memorial’ na 
Severnom Kavkaze” [The European Union condemned the 
persecution of the human-rights centre Memorial in the 
North Caucasus], Kavkazkii Uzel, 19 January 2018, http:// 
www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/315346/. 
73 Cf. this study’s chapter on “Chechnya as a Cross-Border 
Actor”, p. 26. 
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The most visible sign of the changes that Chechnya 
has undergone in the past decade is the appearance 
ofthe capital Grozny. Its magnificent avenues, such as 
Putin Boulevard, and islands of modernisations, such 
as Grozny City with its luxury hotels and boutiques, 
are in sharp contrast to the town reduced to rubble at 
the end of the intense fighting. However, as in a few 
other Caucasian metropolises, this boom façade con-
ceals the socioeconomic realities in each country or 
area. In the case of Chechnya, this also masks the fact 
that the revival on display here was funded less by 
its own economic power than by subsidies from the 
federal budget. 
In May 2004 President Putin visited Grozny to 
attend the funeral of the murdered head of the repub-
lic, Akhmat Kadyrov. At the time, he voiced his horror 
at the devastation in the city. About 154,000 houses 
and apartments in Chechnya had been wholly or 
mostly destroyed. In Grozny that comprised 70 per-
cent of all apartments and houses.74 A year earlier 
the United Nations had described Grozny as the most 
destroyed city in the world. At that time, Chechnya 
was the weakest economic region in the entire Rus-
sian Federation. Fourteen years later, in October 2017, 
Ramzan Kadyrov gushingly praised the reconstruction 
during a ceremony for “Grozny Day”. Grozny, he 
claimed, was a glorious example for the whole North 
Caucasus, whose beauty was lauded the world over; 
multitudes of tourists visited it. Chechnya’s second-
biggest town, Gudermes, has also witnessed a remark-
able reconstruction. There are now plans to demon-
strate, through elaborate tourism projects, just how 
acute the contrast is to the previously war-devastated 
Chechnya. For example, in one of the mountain 
regions that saw the heaviest fighting 15 years ago, 
 
74 Musa Basnukaev, “Reconstruction in Chechnya: At the 
Intersection between Politics and the Economy”, in Chechnya 
at War and Beyond, ed. Anne le Huérou et al. (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 76. 
the Veduchi ski resort is being built at a cost of poten-
tially up to 500 million US dollars.75 
When Ramzan Kadyrov came to power, unemploy-
ment in Chechnya stood at over 70 percent. By late 
2014, this had allegedly been reduced to 21.5 percent, 
although statistical data from Chechnya are extreme-
ly questionable.76 In principle, this is true of all socio-
economic data from the North Caucasus, as was most 
recently emphasised in October 2017 by Natalya 
Zubarevich, an expert on economic development in 
Russia’s regions. Her assessment was made when 
great numbers of governors and representatives of the 
regional power elites in this part of Russia were dis-
missed due to their weak economic performance.77 
Such data are unreliable, Zubarevich points out, if 
only because of the sprawling underground economy. 
On 19 April 2017, President Putin received Kadyrov 
in the Kremlin and emphasised a series of socio-
economic successes. He stated that decrees passed by 
him (Putin) in May 2012 for development in Chech-
nya had been implemented; unemployment had 
already sunk to 9.2 percent; wages were being paid 
regularly; and pre-school education was now avail-
able for 100 percent of children.78 
Despite the Kadyrov regime’s insistence on inde-
pendence, Chechnya’s economy is largely dependent 
 
75 Andrew E. Kramer, “Where Islamists Reigned, a Ski 
Resort Rises”, The New York Times, 1 February 2018. 
76 Hannah Salyers Kibler, Ramzan Kadyrov: Russia’s Vanguard 
of Security or Long-Term Liability? (Tallahassee: Florida State 
University, College of Social Sciences and Public Policy, 
2016), 52. 
77 “Zubarevich: dlja serii otstavok na Severnom Kavkaze 
net ekonomicheskich osnovanij” [Subaryevitch: There are 
no economic reasons for the wave of dismissals in the North 
Caucasus], Kavkazkii Uzel, 6 October 2017, http://www.kavkaz-
uzel.eu/articles/310642. 
78 “Russia: Chechnya Media Highlights 17–23 April 2017”, 
BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union Political File, 
27 April 2017. 
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on both Russia and the local power elite and local 
state bodies. The private or market-based sector is 
largely underdeveloped.79 The minister for the econo-
my in Grozny objects that Chechnya has created a 
favourable climate for investment and that in 2014 
private investments totalled 79 percent of all invest-
ment in the republic. Independent observers, how-
ever, including economists at Chechnya’s State Uni-
versity, are sceptical. They point out that there are 
hardly any jobs in the private sector, but almost 
exclusively in the state apparatus and administration. 
And salaries are exceedingly low, except in the higher 
ranks of the security agencies. One of the few excep-
tions is the Rodina Complex, in which the Chechen 
oligarch Abubakar Arsamakov has invested. The com-
plex encompasses large farms and garden centres, 
for which fallow land in part contaminated by mines 
was made arable.80 The foreign investment which was 
used to nurse Grozny back to health and give it its 
magnificent façades partly came from the United Arab 
Emirates, with which the regime maintains good rela-
tions. Additional resources came from a fund created 
by Ramzan Kadyrov, bearing his father’s name, and 
administered by his mother. The Akhmat Kadyrov 
Fund is stocked using compulsory levies that are de-
ducted from state employees’ pay in a “parallel tax 
system”.81 
Moscow made it clear that Chechnya 
would increasingly have to grow its 
economy on its own strength. 
In Soviet times, the budget of the autonomous 
republic (which at the time consisted of both Chech-
nya and Ingushetia) was already more than 50 per-
cent dependent on subsidies from Moscow. In the 
post-Soviet era, that share has risen to more than 80 
percent. Such high levels of dependence are charac-
teristic for many other federal subjects, not just in the 
North Caucasus but in other areas as well. Under the 
 
79 Kathrin Hille, “Chechnya’s Economic Recovery Tested by 
Slowdown”, Financial Times, 28 April 2015, http://www.ft.com/ 
content/8233d33c-ecd0-11e4-a81a-00144feab7de. 
80 Hannah Salyers Kibler, Ramzan Kadyrov: Russia’s Vanguard 
of Security or Long-Term Liability? (Tallahassee: Florida State 
University, College of Social Sciences and Public Policy, 
2016), 64. 
81 Cf. the detailed treatment in “Fond Kadyrova: kak tratjat 
‘dengi ot Allacha’” [The Kadyrov Fund: How to spend ‘Allah’s 
money’], Kavkazkii Uzel, 6 October 2017, http://www.kavkaz-
uzel.eu/articles/310518/. 
umbrella of a federal programme started in 2002, 
Moscow took care of the reconstruction of houses, 
schools, hospitals and roads in the war-ravaged Chech-
nya with lavish payments. Even after the programme 
ended in 2012, Moscow continued to grant ample 
subsidies, but made it clear that Chechnya would 
increasingly have to grow its economy on its own 
strength. At the time, it was not yet apparent that 
Russia would slide into an economic crisis driven 
by sinking oil prices, sanctions and other factors.82 
 
82 “Against a troubled economic backdrop, the federal 
authorities are less and less apt to give in to Grozny’s ex-
travagant financial demands. The republic’s restoration 
programme drew to a close in 2012, for instance, whereas 
Kadyrov hoped that it would continue until 2017: instead of 
$3 billion, Chechnya has had to make do with $350 million.” 
Laruelle, Kadyrovism (see note 48), 8. 
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Kadyrov’s policies do not stop at his republic’s bor-
ders. They extend primarily to his immediate neigh-
bourhood in the Russian Federation, in the form of 
border disputes with Dagestan and Ingushetia. He has 
laid claim to areas in neighbouring regions that were 
part of Chechnya before the 1944 deportation. A clash 
between Chechen and Ingush authorities occurred 
in 2012 when Chechen security forces carried out a 
special operation in the Ingush village of Galashki. 
In August 2012 Kadyrov criticised his counterpart in 
Ingushetia, Yunus Bek Yevkurov, for not combating 
terrorism in his territory robustly enough: “If Yevku-
rov can’t take care of things, we’ll have to do it. He 
doesn’t seem interested at all. Or what else can he 
mean when he says that he doesn’t want to describe 
terrorists as bandits? As if they’re young people who 
have lost their way. For us, they’re bandits, terrorists, 
satans, enemies of the Chechen and Ingush people, 
enemies of Russia.”83 This criticism referred to Yevku-
rov’s attempt to include Islamist groups in his repub-
lic in a dialogue with the official clergy and govern-
ment officials. Even though these events occurred 
some time ago, the problem of cross-border discord 
has not been resolved. In July 2017, for example, 
there were confrontations in Leninaul district at the 
border with Dagestan between Chechens and mem-
bers of other ethnic groups.84 
When fighting his opponents, Kadyrov reaches far 
beyond Chechnya. As mentioned above, some of his 
adversaries and rivals were murdered in exile – both 
in Russia and abroad – and their relatives in Chech-
nya threatened with collective punishment. This led 
 
83 Quoted in “Kadyrov Ramzan Akhmatovich”, Kavkazkii 
Uzel, 22 December 2017, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/ 
85366/. 
84 “Zhiteli Leninaula rasskazali o strel’be na granice Dages-
tana i Chexhni” [Inhabitants of Leninaul report on shootout 
at the border between Dagestan and Chechnya], Kavkazkii 
Uzel, 8 July 2017, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/305704/. 
to protests outside of Russia as well, for example 
in the Chechen diaspora in Vienna, Stockholm and 
Berlin. In response, Kadyrov threatened activists in 
Europe that any of their relatives still in Chechnya 
would be held responsible.85 
As Putin’s “foot soldier”, the head of the Chechen 
republic supplies Moscow with elite fighters for de-
ployment to Syria and Ukraine. However, Chechens 
can at times fight on both sides of the respective front. 
In East Ukraine, for example, a few hundred Chechens 
sided with Ukrainian combatants against pro-Russian 
separatists. They had been recruited from anti-Rus-
sian exile groups hostile to Kadyrov and are organised 
into two brigades. One is named after Dzhokhar 
Dudayev, the leader of the Chechen secession move-
ment in the 1990s; the other after Sheikh Mansur, the 
first leader of the Chechen resistance against Russian 
invasions into the North Caucasus in the late 18th cen-
tury. On the opposite side, about 300 Chechens loyal 
to Kadyrov fought for the separatists in Donbass sup-
ported by Moscow.86 Russia’s incursions into Ukraine 
are explicitly supported by Grozny. For the third 
anniversary of the referendum on the annexation of 
Crimea by Russia, Kadyrov organised a sports festival 
in March 2017 under the title “Crimea and Russia – 
We belong together”.87 Shortly before, on 23 January 
2017, Kadyrov had finally admitted that Chechen 
troops were stationed in Syria. The above-mentioned 
Adam Delimkhanov was entrusted with forming the 
Chechen units to be sent to Syria. Inter alia they 
served for some time with the Russian military police 
near Aleppo. After a deployment to Syria lasting 
 
85 Emil Souleimanov, “Kadyrov Represses Dissent among 
European Chechens”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 9 March 
2016. 
86 Laruelle, Kadyrovism (see note 48), 17. 
87 “Russia: Chechnya Media Highlights 13–19 March 
2017“, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union 
Political File, 25 March 2017. 
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several months, the Chechen military-police troops 
returned home in February 2018. 
Nevertheless Kadyrov presents himself as a leader 
of Muslims in Russia and internationally in such a 
way that it challenges Moscow in both its domestic 
and foreign policy. This became evident in 2017 
in connection with the state violence against the 
Rohingya Muslim ethnic group in Myanmar, a vio-
lence with genocidal characteristics. Kadyrov por-
trayed himself once again as an important voice in 
the Islamic world. On 4 September 2017 he organised 
a mass demonstration with an alleged one million 
participants – according to the Russian newspaper 
Novaya Gazeta there were only about 100,000 – who 
were supposed to express their solidarity with their 
persecuted Islamic brothers and sisters in Southeast 
Asia. Members of the Muslim Spiritual Administra-
tions (muftiates) of other North Caucasian autono-
mous republics also took part in the demonstration. 
President Putin and the Russian government were 
urged to take a decisive stance in this foreign affair. 
Before the demonstration, in a Youtube video, Kady-
rov criticised comments by Moscow for suggesting 
that both the Russian and Chinese leaderships sup-
ported the authorities in Myanmar, pointing to the 
existence of rebel groups among the Rohingya.88 It is 
unlikely that the Kadyrov factor carries much weight 
in the Sino-Russian relationship.89 Nevertheless, 
because there were also demonstrations in other Mus-
lim regions of the Federation against the persecution 
of the Rohingya, including in Moscow in front of the 
Embassy of Myanmar, Kadyrov did cause the Kremlin 
some difficulties with his statement. Russian political 
experts such as Fedor Lukyanov see this as the first 
serious foreign-policy disagreement between Moscow 
and Grozny.90 However, in 2012 Kadyrov had already 
 
88 “Chechnya Holds Massive Rally in Support of Myan-
mar’s Rohingya”, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet 
Union Political File, 4 September 2017. 
89 “Politologi kritichno ocenili znachimost’ ‘faktora Kady-
rova’ v voprosakh otnoshenij Moskvy i Pekina” [Political sci-
entists gauge the importance of the ‘Kadyrov Factor’ for the 
relationship between Moscow and Beijing], Kavkazkii Uzel, 7 
September 2017, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/309143/. 
90 “Given the growing role and influence of the Muslim 
community in Russian politics the authorities can hardly 
ignore such sentiments. Especially when they are expressed 
by such an influential Muslim politician as Ramzan Kadyrov 
[…]. It seems the first time Kadyrov and the authorities dis-
agree so much on an issue, which is even more important as 
it puts Russia in a complicated position in its relations with 
called on the Russian government to pay more 
attention to the repression of the Rohingya.91 
Five years later, Muslims in different 
parts of Russia proclaimed their 
solidarity with their persecuted 
fellow believers in Myanmar. 
Five years later, Muslims in different parts of 
Russia – Moscow, Grozny, the Dagestani capital 
Makhachkala, the capital of Karachay-Cherkessia, 
Cherkessk, and elsewhere – proclaimed their soli-
darity with their persecuted fellow believers in Myan-
mar. Experts believe this shows the “rise of a political 
Islam in Russia” headed by Kadyrov.92 Anti-Buddhist 
slogans appeared during the demonstrations and on 
social networks, and even calls for Muslims to go on 
jihad to Myanmar and stand by the Rohingya. The 
Russian security authorities, however, abstained from 
violent measures against the demonstrators. 
Transposing the violence in Myanmar – deplored 
by the United Nations as a brutal “ethnic cleansing” 
– onto a religious level and stylising the conflict as a 
faith dispute between Buddhists and Muslims would 
first and foremost harm those countries in South and 
Southeast Asia where the two faith communities live 
as neighbours. However, the multiethnic state of Rus-
sia could also be affected, since Islam and Buddhism 
along with Orthodox Christianity are officially con-
sidered its “traditional religions”. The autonomous 
republic of Kalmykia has the largest Buddhist-Lamaist 
ethnic group in European Russia; it is located close to 
the North Caucasus, where there were the strongest 
 
China, Myanmar’s main patron.” Fedor Lukyanow, quoted in 
“Russian Press Views Chechen Leader’s Bid for New Status”, 
BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union Political File, 
6 September 2017. 
91 On 13 August 2012 he wrote on Chechnya’s official 
website: “I ask the leadership of our country and the Orga-
nisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to use all available 
diplomatic, political and economic means to end the reli-
gious-ethnic cleansing – the genocide – in Myanmar.” 
Quoted in “Zajavleniya Kadyrova o M’janme priveli k zader-
zhaniyam v Rossii” [Kadyrov’s declarations have led to 
arrests in Russia], Kavkazkii Uzel, 11 September 2017, http:// 
www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/309410/. 
92 Sergei Markedonov, Myanmar, Russia’s Muslims, and a New 
Foreign Policy (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 12 Septem-
ber 2017); Ridvan Bari Urcosta, “Far Away Myanmar Trigger-
ing Rise of Political Islam in Russia”, Jamestown Foundation 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 13 September 2017. 
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reactions to the persecution of the Rohingya. And 
social networks calling on Muslisms to demonstrate 
have already carried hate speech against Kalmyks.93 
However, the overall attitude of Russia’s population 
towards Buddhists has not worsened, as a Levada 
Centre survey on relationships with faith communi-
ties showed in December 2017.94 
Among the Russian general public, there emerged 
a number of possible explanations for the outbursts 
in parts of the Muslim community. Some employed 
well-established propaganda templates and accused 
the USA of being behind the wave of protests and 
agitating Russia’s Muslims. Others blamed Turkey 
and Saudi Arabia for spreading hysteria. Above all, 
however, people pointed to the political ambitions 
of the head of the Chechen republic, whom they see 
as trying to cement his role as “guardian of Islam” 
during the crisis. This was not necessarily viewed as 
exclusively negative. With Kadyrov’s support, some 
say, Russia could also foster “spiritual ties” with the 
Islamic world, and capitalise in terms of both domes-
tic and foreign policy. After all, Kadyrov professes his 
affiliation not only with Islam but also with Russia 
and President Putin.95 
Indeed, the Chechen leadership portrays itself as 
Moscow’s assistant in the latter’s Middle-East policy 
– an area which, at the very least since the military 
deployment in Syria, has once again played a promi-
nent role in Russia’s foreign policy. In the person of 
Ziyad Sabsazi, Chechnya has its very own ambassador 
to the Midde East and North Africa. He is currently 
employed particularly to repatriate nationals of 
Russia and all CIS countries from the war zones in 
Syria, Iraq and Libya. Kadyrov’s father Akhmat, who 
began a degree in Islamic law in Jordan in 1990, 
nurtured relations with statesmen in the Middle East 
during his term in office as mufti and later as Chech-
nya’s president. Sabsazi, a Chechen born in Aleppo, 
served as his consultant.96 
 
93 Ibid., 3. 
94 Otnoshenie k religiyam [Attitudes to religion] (Moscow: 
Levada Centre, 23 January 2018), http://www.levada.ru/2018/ 
01/23/otnoshenie-k-religiyam/. 
95 “Groznoe preduzprezhdenie” [Warning from 
Grozny], Gazeta.ru, 4 September 2017, http://www.gazeta.ru/ 
comments/2017/09/04_e_10873592.shtml?mc_cid= 
5d6588ce8e&mc_eid=9eaa49374d. 
96 Pavel Luzin, “Ramzan Kadyrov: Russia’s Top Diplomat”, 
Intersection (Security), 11 April 2017, http://intersectionproject. 
eu/article/security/ramzan-kadyrov-russias-top-diplomat. 
Kadyrov presents Chechnya as a significant actor 
in Syria due to its participation not only in Russia’s 
military deployments, but also in the reconstruction 
of the war-ravaged country. For example, the Akhmat 
Kadyrov Foundation financially supports the restora-
tion of Aleppo’s main mosque and further mosques 
in Homs. Chechen television showed Adam Delim-
khanov at Friday prayer in the courtyard of the 
Umayyad Mosque of Aleppo, which was still strewn 
with rubble from the many weeks of fighting in the 
town. Thereafter, Delimkhanov and Chechnya’s mufti 
visited a police bataillon staffed by fellow Chechens 
patrolling the streets of Aleppo and Delimkhanov gave 
speeches in the Chechen language.97 
Kadyrov’s Middle-East Policy reaches 
far beyond Syria and is mostly 
orientated towards Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf States. 
Admittedly, Kadyrov’s Middle-East Policy reaches 
far beyond Syria and is mostly orientated towards 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, with which Chech-
nya also has economic relations. Kadyrov had already 
had links to the Saudi Defence Minister Mohammad 
bin Salman before the latter became the new Crown 
Prince of Saudi Arabia. However, this cooperation 
with the Wahhabite kingdom clashed with a reso-
lution adopted by an international congress of Islamic 
theologians in Grozny in 2016. The so-called Grozny 
Fatwa condemns “religious extremism in all its forms”, 
counting Wahhabism and Salafism as among the 
“dangerous currents”. The fatwa created controversy 
among Islam scholars and the official muftiate clergy 
in Russia.98 In November 2016 Saudi media reported 
that Kadyrov had clarified during a meeting with the 
Crown Prince that the statement against Wahhabism 
was a misunderstanding.99 Relations with Riadh have 
not suffered. Kadyrov emphatically categorises Saudi 
Arabia as an indispensable partner in fighting inter-
national terrorism. In late May 2017, the Chechen 
mufti met the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait in Moscow and praised Chechnya as “a reli-
 
97 Albert Aji, “Chechnya a Major Player in Rebuilding 
Syria”, The Daily Star, 19 July 2017. 
98 Liz Fuller, “Grozny Fatwa on ‘True Believers’ Triggers 
Major Controversy”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Caucasus 
Report), 14 September 2016, http://www.rferl.org/a/caucasus-
report-grozny-fatwa-controversy/27987472.html. 
99 “Kadyrov Ramzan Akhmatovich”, Kavkazkii Uzel, 22 
December 2017, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/85366/. 
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able bridge between the Islamic world and Russia”.100 
In early October 2017, when the Saudi king became 
the first Saudi ruler to visit Russia since the foun-
dation of the kingdom, Russian media presented his 
visit as one of the most significant foreign-policy 
events in recent years. Chechnya once again boasted 
about acting as a bridge between Russia and the 
Islamic world. 
Kadyrov reinforces this role with 
fiercely anti-Western rhetoric. 
Kadyrov reinforces this role with fiercely anti-
Western rhetoric. He likes to issue reminders of what 
was probably the biggest demonstration ever to be 
held in Grozny, in connection with the international 
confrontation over the Islamist terror attacks in Janu-
ary 2015 on the Charlie Hebdo editorial office and 
others in Paris. Using the slogan, “We Are Not Char-
lie”, Kadyrov ordered a mass demonstration against 
the caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed published 
in Western media and against the satirical treatment 
of religion. Demonstrators differentiated themselves 
from the Western response to the attacks and deplored 
the violation of religious sentiments by “Western 
freedom of opinion”. Kadyrov’s right-hand man as 
regards anti-Western ideology is Dshambulat Umarov, 
the Chechen Minister for Nationalities Policy, Ex-
ternal Relations, the Press and Information, and 
author of a book entitled The KRA Factor: Confrontation, 
where KRA stands for Kadyrov, Ramzan Akhmato-
vich. Umarov depicts the Chechen leader as a key 
figure in the fight against “Western conspiracies 
against Russia” and underscores his role with reli-
gious arguments.101 
During the Temple Mount conflict, which was 
sparked by restrictions on access to the Al-Aqsa 
Mosque in Jerusalem in 2017, Chechnya also came 
into conflict with Israel. In July, the republic’s muf-
tiate published a declaration that was understood 
by the Chechen people as almost a call to jihad.102 
 
100 “Russia: Chechnya Media Highlights, 22 May–4 June 
2017”, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union 
Political File, 6 June 2017. 
101 Quoted in Denis Grekov, “Kadyrov’s Myanmar Offen-
sive and Its Consequences”, Intersection (Politics), 25 September 
2017, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/politics/kadyrovs-
myanmar-offensive-and-its-consequences. 
102 “DUM Chechni poyasnilo svoe otnoshenie k dzhichadu 
protiv Izrailya” [The Spiritual Administration of Chechnya’s 
Muslims has taken a stand on the jihad against Israel], 
Kadyrov then proposed an agreement to guarantee 
access for Muslims to their holy sites in Jerusalem and 
the security of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and offered him-
self as “guardian of Al Aqsa”. Once the mosque was 
openly accessible again, Kadyrov claimed substantial 
credit for the Chechen authorities having settled the 
dispute. 
In the same year, Grozny also offered to host inter-
national conferences on humanitarian aid. According 
to the Ministry for Nationalities Policy, External Rela-
tions, the Press and Information the reasons for this 
proposal were Chechnya’s authority across the East, 
the cordial personal relationships Ramzan Kadyrov 
maintains with many leaders of the Islamic world and 
the participation of Chechen authorities in a “policy 
of people’s diplomacy” and in organising humanitarian 
aid abroad.103 An aid project frequently referenced is 
the financial support given by the Akhmat Kadyrov 
Fund to Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. 
 
Kavkazkii Uzel, 24 July 2017, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/ 
articles/306587/. 
103 “Gumanitarnuju pomoshch vezut v Groznyj” [Humani-
tarian aid is given in Grozny], Kommersant, 14 June 2017. 
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With its secession movement in the 1990s and its 
confrontation with Moscow during two wars, Chech-
nya became the pars pro toto for the North Caucasus 
in European eyes. In the years that followed, armed 
Islamist underground movements also developed in 
other parts of Russia’s Caucasian periphery, thus 
broadening the European perspective. Since the end 
of large-scale hostilities a decade ago, Chechnya has 
no longer stood out as the epicentre of violence in 
the region. Yet it has not been lastingly pacified. The 
same is true of the North Caucasus overall. In the last 
three to four years, violent incidents and the fighting 
capacity of insurgents have declined so much that the 
region hardly registers as a significant problem among 
Russians. In December 2017 the Russian domestic 
secret service FSB officially announced that the armed 
underground in the North Caucasus was now com-
pletely eliminated.104 Experts on the region have their 
doubts about this assessment, since fights between 
security forces and insurgents continue. Furthermore, 
the return of Caucasian jihad migrants from Islamist 
fight formations abroad could become a security chal-
lenge. This is particularly true of the largest republic 
in the North Caucasus, Dagestan. In 2013 its ruler, 
Ramazan Abdulatipov, announced that he was crush-
ing the armed underground and combating corrup-
tion. However, those goals have not been (wholly) 
accomplished. As a consequence, he was replaced 
in October 2017 with a former high-ranking police 
officer from Moscow, in the most muscular interven-
tion by the Russian central government in regional 
affairs in the North Caucasus.105 In January and 
February 2018, Dagestan’s entire government was 
dismissed, and there followed the most unyielding 
purge to date in an autonomous republic, using 
 
104 “Rossiya vyigrala eshche odnu vazhnejshuju bitvu” 
[Russia has won another decisive battle], Vzgljad Delovaja 
Gazeta, 19 December 2017, https://vz.ru/politics/2017/12/19/ 
900398.html?mc_cid=e7db48683e&mc_eid=9eaa49374d. 
105 Cf. Paul Goble, “A Year in Review: For the North Cau-
casus in 2017, Old Problems Remain while New Ones Arise”, 
Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, 9 January 2018. 
federal-security and law-enforcement agencies includ-
ing the attorney general and FSB. In the run-up to the 
presidential elections in Russia, these operations were 
meant to signal a further tightening of the “vertical 
of power” vis-à-vis problem regions such as the North 
Caucasus.106 With increasing frequency, high-ranking 
administrative cadres from other parts of the country 
are appointed to Russia’s republics in the North Cau-
casus. 
In contrast, Ramzan Kadyrov’s rule as head of the 
Chechen republic seems largely protected from such 
measures. To date, the loyalty pact between the Rus-
sian president and his liege in this historically exposed 
federal subject remains largely intact. President Putin 
has accepted the stabilisation price for “pacifying” the 
former war zone. These include serious human-rights 
abuses in the republic itself; political murders that 
remain unsolved; sometimes high-handed foreign-
policy initiatives; and an “Islamisation from above” 
creating a legal situation within Chechnya that partly 
contradicts Russian legislation. The federal power 
vertical has been tightened throughout the whole 
Russian Federation, as was demonstrated by the vigor-
ous replacement of personnel within the regional 
elites before the presidential elections of March 2018. 
Nevertheless, the leadership of Chechnya undaunted-
ly presents itself as a sort of sultanate that ostensibly 
will not listen to reason from anyone but President 
Putin himself. There is speculation as to whether the 
Putin-Kadyrov pact might shift somewhat during the 
Russian leader’s fourth term in office. The question 
also arises what would happen should Putin ever 
exercise his authority after all and demand a per-
sonnel change at the top of the Chechen republic. 
Kadyrov himself has repeatedly stated that he will 
 
106 Maria Dománska/Wojciech Górecki, A Purge in Dages-
tan ahead of the Russian Election (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern 
Studies [OSW], 14 February 2018), http://www.osw.waw.pl/ 
en/publikacje/analyses/2018-02-14/a-purge-dagestan-ahead-
russian-election. 
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cede his place if President Putin demands it.107 So 
far, the Russian general public has not expected or 
demanded such a measure: according to a Levada 
Centre opinion poll published in October 2017, 
Kadyrov ranks seventh among ten politicians in 
Russia trusted by the public, and is seen as a “strong 
leader”.108 The Russian president’s press spokesman, 
Dmitri Peskov, confirmed on 27 November 2017 that 
the Kremlin continues to view Kadyrov as the head 
of the Chechen republic. Kadyrov’s cousin and right-
hand man in Moscow, Adam Delimkhanov, affirmed 
this, saying the future of the republic was unthinka-
ble without Ramzan Kadyrov.109 Similar statements 
are made by the Russian power elite about the cur-
rent president. For instance, Duma Chairman Vya-
cheslav Volodin has issued the slogan “Putin is Russia 
– without Putin no Russia”.110 Nevertheless, it is not 
guaranteed that the loyalty pact between Putin and 
Kadyrov will endure throughout Putin’s fourth term 
in office. There is currently no fierce resistance in 
Chechnya to Kadyrov. For the time being, the contrast 
with the horrific war period continues to hold sway; 
with his references to “pacification” and “reconstruc-
tion”, Kadyrov aims to keep it that way. It is doubtful, 
however, whether this contrast can lastingly mask the 
frustration caused by his reign of terror and the socio-
economic conditions in the republic. 
Regardless of the foreign-policy ambitions of its 
ruler, Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus 
are seen as an internal affair for the Russian Federa-
tion. In contrast to the South Caucasus with its three 
independent states and unsolved territorial conflicts, 
Russia’s Caucasian region is not open to international 
politics. The exception is Chechnya’s economic and 
political relationship with Arab Gulf States. Particu-
larly since the Second Chechen War, the influence of 
Europe and international organisations on the peace 
settlement has been noticeably limited.111 Prior to 
that, the OSCE in particular was involved as a media-
 
107 “Zajavlenie Kadyrova o gotovnosti k otstavke stalo 
vtorym za chetyre mesjaca” [Kadyrov’s statement on his 
willingness to resign: the second in only four months], 
Kavkazkii Uzel, 29 November 2017, http://www.kavkaz-
uzel.eu/articles/313122/. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Quoted in Andreas Rüesch, “Herrscher über eine 
Sackgasse”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 26 January 2018. 
111 Cf.  Europa im Tschetschenienkrieg. Zwischen politischer 
Ohnmacht und Gleichgültigkeit, ed. Martin Malek and Anna 
Schor-Tschudnowskaja (Stuttgart, 2008). 
tor in the conflict between Moscow and Grozny. In 
1995, after Russian troops marched into the renegade 
republic, it founded an assistance group for Chech-
nya; helped (under its leader Tim Guldimann, a Swiss 
diplomat) to end the First Chechen War; and kept a 
presence in the war-ravaged republic until late 1998. 
Because of the dramatic security situation during the 
interwar period and the anarchy reigning in Chech-
nya, which was de facto independent as of 1996, the 
OSCE was forced to evacuate the assistance group to 
Moscow; the lack of an international presence in the 
conflict area during the Second Chechen War, as of 
October 1999, was conspicuous.112 In 2001 the OSCE 
assistance reinstated itself in Chechnya, in Znamen-
skoye, a location that had been largely spared by the 
war. However, its remit was severely restricted and 
it was ultimately unable to fulfil its original far-
reaching mandate – mediating between the parties 
involved in the conflict, observing human rights, 
promoting the rule of law, protecting the population, 
and facilitating the return of refugees. In late 2002 its 
mandate was not renewed. Its mission, and an inter-
national presence in Chechnya, ended just as Moscow 
was initiating its policy of Chechenisation, and the 
rise of the Kadyrov clan began. 
And yet developments in Chechnya and the North 
Caucasus continue to have international importance 
and an impact on Europe due to the flow of refugees 
and migrants. Since the start of the Second Chechen 
War, between 130,000 and 150,000 refugees and 
migrants from Chechnya have made their way to the 
EU, especially to France, Austria, Belgium and Ger-
many. During the First Chechen War, many inhabit-
ants also fled the large-scale violence, but they re-
mained in their close or extended neighbourhood: 
Dagestan, Ingushetia or the Russian interior. A flow 
of refugees towards Europe mainly began during 
the Second Chechen War. In 1999, only 368 Russian 
nationals applied for asylum in Germany; a year later 
it was already 3,001 (including 1,025 Chechens), and 
in 2001 4,824 (including 1,994 Chechens). Since 2012 
the figures have risen again, peaking in 2013 with 
14,487 applications. Their success rate was highest 
between 2003 and 2005 (2004: 32 percent). By con-
trast, in 2016 just over 4 percent of applications were 
 
112 “Rückkehr der OSZE nach Tschetschenien”, Neue Zür-
cher Zeitung, 15 June 2001; Wolfgang Grycz, “Tschetschenien 
vor Ort. Interview mit dem OSZE-Beauftragten Botschafter 
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accepted. Of the more than 12,000 citizens of the 
Russian Federation seeking asylum in Germany that 
year, 9,850 were Chechens, i.e. over 80 percent.113 
Representatives of the Chechen diaspora in Paris, 
Berlin and Vienna point out that the migration and 
refugee crisis in the EU is noticeably transforming 
asylum policy.114 The German intelligence service 
has recently warned of increased terror threats from 
battle-hardened Islamists from the North Caucasus, 
who have been involved in armed conflicts on foreign 
jihad fronts in the Middle East. 
However, equating Chechen migrants with mili-
tant Islamists must be treated cautiously. Human-
rights abuses on Kadyrov’s territory are not only 
forcing the markedly reduced armed underground to 
emigrate from Chechnya, but also those affected by 
collective punishment, those identified as opponents 
and critics of the head of the republic, or accused of 
transgressing Chechen tradition through their sexual 
orientation. 
The link between migration problems and human-
rights problems demands international attention for 
the situation in Chechnya. Accordingly, international 
organisations and governments in Europe and the 
USA have expressed their concern about the precari-
ous human-rights situation in the Caucasus republic 
more frequently since March 2017 than at almost any 
other time during the past decade. 
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